



Time transfers from adult children to elderly parents: Hungary in European context

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Motivation, research questions

Motivation:

- Intergenerational transfers affect well-being of recipients/donors.
- Pressure on pension systems in ageing societies: can family solidarity attenuate the consequences?
- Research identifies patterns of transfers in EU15 countries: North-South divide.

Research questions:

- How does Hungary compare to other Eastern European countries and the transfer regimes typical in European countries?
- Focus: elderly parents' receipt of time transfers (help, care) from non-coresident children




Approach

The difference between HU and other countries can be related to

- differences in **micro-level** determinants:
 - needs (eg. high prevalence of ADL, IADL)
 - opportunities (children tend to be closer, low female empl.)
 - reciprocity (HU in lower half)
- differences in **macro-level** determinants:
 - institutional context: crowding out/in? (eg. Brandt et al. 2009, Deindl and Brandt 2011):
 - cultural factors (eg. Kalmijn and Saraceno 2008): shared norms regarding filial responsibility affects behaviour

Method: two stage method instead of multilevel modelling

Policy regimes in elderly care



Source: Saraceno and Keck 2010, Fig 6.

Data, measurement

Data: SHARE Wave 4 (2011), 16 countries (5 Eastern European)

Survey item: Time transfers (family respondent):

- *(SP002) Thinking about the last twelve months has any family member from outside the household, any friend or neighbour given you or your husband/wife/partner/partner personal care or practical household help?*
- *If yes, from whom and how often (3 possibilities)*

Main dependent variable:

0-parental hhd has not received any help, care from children

1-parental hhd received only occasional help, care from children

2-parental hhd received frequent (almost daily) help, care from ch.



Independent variables: micro level

Parental need (couple level):

- Ill health: (difficulties with ADL, IADL)
- Low income: (quintiles of equivalised household income)
- Age (75+), household structure

Opportunities for transfers


- Number/gender of children
- Proximity (no, some, all children live at least 25km away),
- Having non-working children
- Number of grandchildren

Reciprocity: transfers given by respondents to children:

- Financial (40 000HUF or more)
- Support (help, care, grandchild care)



% of parents 65+ receiving support from non-coresident children (having at least one child over 21 outside the household)



Results: Micro level determinants – „needs” (average marginal effects from multinomial logit model)

	All countries pooled		Eastern European countries pooled		Hungary	
	Occasional support	Frequent support	Occasional support	Frequent support	Occasional support	Frequent support
75 or older	0.029***	0.017***	-0.002	0.021*	-0.022	0.041
Household structure						
single men	0	0	0	0	0	0
single women	0.036***	0.000	0.072***	0.015	0.005	0.028
couple	-0.047***	-0.044***	-0.018	-0.056***	-0.069	-0.102
other	-0.051***	-0.040***	-0.034	-0.044**	-0.036	-0.067
ADL	0.007**	0.005***	0.010*	0.007**	0.007	0.005
IADL	0.016***	0.013***	0.020***	0.020***	0.027***	0.023***
Quintiles of hhd income						
1	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	-0.001	-0.007	-0.011	-0.015	0.025	-0.028
3	0.007	-0.015***	0.006	-0.023*	0.047	-0.059*
4	0.005	-0.018***	0.000	-0.025*	-0.037	0.008
5	0.001	-0.006	-0.002	-0.019	0.029	0.014



Results: Micro level determinants – „opportunities”

	All countries pooled		Eastern European countries pooled		Hungary	
	Occasional support	Frequent support	Occasional support	Frequent support	Occasional support	Frequent support
Number of daughters						
No	0	0	0	0	0	0
One	0.008	0.010*	-0.005	0.012	0.031	-0.002
More	0.015	0.019***	0.001	0.020	0.070	0.014
Number of sons						
No	0	0	0	0	0	0
One	0.000	0.004	0.003	0.008	0.042	-0.032
More	0.010	0.012*	0.003	0.021	0.061	-0.030
Number of coresident children	-0.022**	0.011**	-0.046**	0.012	-0.132*	0.038
Proximity						
No child lives min. 25 km away	0	0	0	0	0	0
One child lives min. 25 km	-0.007	-0.013**	0.010	-0.008	0.008	0.015
All children live 25 km away	-0.014*	-0.050***	0.001	-0.065***	-0.012	-0.042*
Non working child	-0.005	0.011***	-0.011	0.008	-0.004	-0.001
Average age of children	0.002***	0.001***	0.003***	0.002***	0.004	-0.001
Number of grandchildren	0.003**	0.000	0.005*	-0.001	-0.004	0.002



Results: Micro level determinants – „reciprocity”

	All countries pooled		Eastern European countries pooled		Hungary	
	Occasional support	Frequent support	Occasional support	Frequent support	Occasional support	Frequent support
Financial transfer to children	0.030***	0.001	0.042***	0.008	0.012	-0.003
Support given to children	0.057***	0.009*	0.091***	0.020*	0.059	0.012



Independent variables: macro level

Institutional context:


- Public expenditure on LTC services (at institutions and at home) as % of GDP, 2010
- Public expenditure on LTC cash transfers as % of GDP, 2010
- Source: Lypszic et al. (2012, EC DG ECFIN)

Norms:

- % agreeing with: „Children should pay for the care of their parents if their parents' income is not sufficient”
- Source: Special Eurobarometer 283, 2007




Public LTC services and help to parents





Norms of filial responsibility and level of help to parents





Conclusions

- Results for micro-level determinants:
 - needy (single, ill health) parents receive more support (both types),
 - daughters provide more frequent support
 - proximity important for frequent support
 - reciprocity is more important for occasional support
- Frequent support is related to macro-level indicators:
 - public expenditure on LTC services.
 - norms of filial responsibility
- HU and Eastern EU countries:
 - heterogeneous in occasional support
 - generally high level of frequent support
 - differences remain after controlling for micro-level factors
 - for **frequent support** this can be related to low public support and high level of filial responsibility

Limitations:

- No possibility of dyad-level analysis with the current release.
- No information in the survey on values.